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THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. BY Malcolm M. Fee-
ley and Austin .D. Sarai. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 1980. Pp. viii, 172. $17.50. 
Among the Great Society programs whose value has been ques-
tioned is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681 
(SSA), "the master plan for the national war on crime" (p. 4). Al-
though only "suggestive answers" can be given to the "question of 
whether the expenditures of billions of dollars under the . . . Act 
helped to reduce the crime rate, alleviate the crime problem, or in-
crease government's crime fighting capabilities" (pp. 4-5), Malcolm 
Feeley and Austin Sarat believe that the Act's effectiveness can be 
measured indirectly by examining its implementation. In The Policy 
.Dilemma, they report the harsh conclusions of such an examination. 
The Act, they found, 
has not led to the creation of institutions which have developed the 
authority and expertise to significantly alter traditional crime fighting 
, strategies. In this respect the Act must be considered a failure, or its 
importance must be downgraded and it must more modestly be consid-
ered little more than a structure for distributing federal funds to hard-
pressed local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. Even 
here, however, its success is in doubt because there are other more cost-
effective ways to achieve this same aim. [Pp. 5-6.] 
Feeley and Sarat blame the Act's failure on what they call "the Pol-
icy Dilemma" - an increasing demand for public services despite a 
growing recognition that the government is unable to deliver these 
services efficiently and effectively (p. 11). 
I. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 app., 28, 42, 47 
U.S.C.). 
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Feeley and Sarat consider two distinct explanations of the Policy 
Dilemma. The first attributes the failure of governmental policy to 
the indecision of politically motivated policy-makers. Such indeci-
sion leads to policy that is poorly designed and often inconsistent 
and to the ineffective use of the public authority.2 The second views 
the problem as structural: The implementation process itself cannot 
effectively translate policy into action. Since self-interested bureau-
crats administer the programs, their results invariably differ from the 
articulated policy, even if that policy is decisive and well-inten-
tioned.3 Feeley and Sarat use these theories to explain the failure of 
the SSA. 
They first describe the social and political climate that led to the 
passage of the Act. The rising crime rate and outbreak of racial vio-
lence in the 1960s had made crime a politically important issue. The 
Johnson Administration proposed the legislation in 1967 to combat 
the public perception that it was soft on crime. The compromise that 
emerged from Congress, however, differed substantially from the 
Administration's proposal. Congressional displeasure with Great 
Society grant-in-aid programs and the political climate created by 
candidates Nixon and Wallace both contributed to dramatic changes 
in the original bill. The initial proposal was designed to attack the 
roots of crime, but the compromise version instead emphasized in-
creasing the effectiveness oflaw enforcement. Feeley and Sarat's at-
tempt to analyze the failure of the SSA in terms of political resolve 
leaves the reader somewhat confused because their analysis does not 
help the reader to place the Act's failure into perspective. Their dis-
cussion of the first explanation of the Policy Dilemma may thus be 
of little interest to readers unfamiliar with public policy analysis. 
The authors' exploration of the second theory begins by describ-
ing the mechanics of the Act. The SSA created the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) to distribute planning 
funds and action grants, sponsor research and development projects, 
and provide technical assistance to the states. State Planning Agen-
cies (SPAs) were established to coordinate state-wide attacks on 
crime. The Act also provided for Regional Planning Units, which 
· performed functions similar to those of the SP As at the local level. 
Congress articulated broad policy goals and established procedures 
for determining the sorts of projects to be pursued, but offered no 
concrete suggestions. 
The remainder of the book examines three areas where federal 
crime policy has been ineffective: comprehensive planning, innova-
tion, and evaluation. In analyzing these areas, Feeley and Sarat 
maintain that the SSA failed because of structural and organiza-
2. See T. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1974). 
3. See J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1973). 
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tional defects in the LEAA and the SP As. These defects, they argue, 
result from poorly defined goals, poor planning, and the ineffective 
use of public authority. 
Although planning was a major concern of the LEAA and the 
SP As, Feeley and Sarat' s research indicates that there was no uni-
form conception of "planning." Interviews with SP A officials re-
vealed six distinct, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of 
"comprehensive planning" under the SSA. The authors argue that 
such confusion is built into the Act because of its conflicting goals. 
The block grant approach seeks to minimize federal interference, but 
one of the Act's underlying premises is that the decentralized nature 
of law enforcement precludes meaningful reform. 
The SSA's failure to provide a coherent and well-defined concept 
of "innovation" also contributes to its failure. The responsibility for 
innovation fell on the SP As, which lacked the means, the authority, 
and the freedom to innovate. Feeley and Sarat blame this defect on 
the political compromise necessary to get the SSA through Congress: 
"The block grant structure appears to be a near-perfect instrument 
for launching a bold vision, while at the same time assuring that it 
will have no fundamental impact" (p. 97). 
Although Feeley and Sarat's research revealed no confusion 
about the meaning of "evaluation," they did find that there had been 
little me~gful evaluation of how effectively LEAA funds were be-
ing used. Many SP A officials considered evaluation a waste of time 
and money because the evaluations were rarely used in future plan-
ning. Since goals were often expressed vaguely, moreover, it was 
difficult to establish meaningful criteria by which to judge effective-
ness. The authors' research also suggests the existence of organiza-
tional impediments to meaningful evaluation, including, for 
example, a lack of coordination between planning and evaluation 
staffs, SP As' lack of control over funded projects, and complex fund-
ing requirements. 
Feeley and Sarat conclude that although the LEAA has effi-
ciently distributed federal aid to local law enforcement agencies, the 
jury is still out on whether its efforts have reduced crime. Whatever 
success·the Act has had in reducing crime, they argue, cannot be 
credited to the vision of its drafters. The Act "presented a broad but 
essentially rhetorical vision which substituted expenditure for goals. 
The result is an administrative structure without the ability or au-
thority to translate vision and money into a coherent plan" (p. 135). 
Although The Policy .Dilemma attempts to examine carefully the 
failure of the SSA in light of the policy dilemma presented by an 
increased demand for public services and the government's decreas-
ing ability to provide such services, the discussion proceeds in such 
broad terms that one quickly loses interest. The book is essentially a 
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formal analysis of the SSA and is unconcerned with the development 
of concrete programs under the Act. To remain interested in Feeley 
and Sarat' s study, the reader must be familiar with either general 
public policy analysis or the Act itself. For readers with the requisite 
background, however, the book may prove enlightening. 
